The Pelicans Select Jordan Hawkins
An analysis of the draft philosophy and what exactly happened on draft night
After an eventful few weeks and a cacophony of drama surrounding the Pelicans’ pursuit of Scoot Henderson, the Pelicans opted to stay put at 14 and make the “safe” pick. The night kicked off with a bomb from Shams Charania revealing the Pelicans had secured a meeting with Scoot Henderson in recent days. Sources confirm that the Pelicans did indeed travel and meet with Henderson this past weekend, and speculation was once again renewed after this news became public. Not thirty minutes prior to the draft beginning, the conversation was once again tilted towards which of the Pelicans’ two stars would be on the move, and if the Pelicans could truly resist pulling out of a deal after meeting with Henderson.
Nevertheless, once the draft began, the drama quickly subsided as Scoot Henderson was selected third overall to the Portland Blazers. From there it was all eyes on what would happen with the 14th pick. I would say the first surprise of the draft came at six, with Anthony Black going to Orlando. From there the precipitous Cam Whitmore slide led to a level of unpredictability with regards to who would be available at 14. With no real surprises in the top 10, Orlando once again surprised folks by selecting Jett Howard at 11. What would happen next is rather unfortunate for the Pelicans as two of their preferred selections would slide off the draft board back to back in Dereck Lively II and Gradey Dick. For a brief moment it appeared that Dick would indeed be available at 14, but Toronto secured the 6’7’’ sharpshooter and the Pelicans went with their next best choice in Jordan Hawkins.
I am told Hawkins had earned many big fans in the Pelicans front office over the course of the draft process. As David Griffin would go on to mention in his press conference, the “quality of human” was selling point for the young NCAA champion, in addition to his much needed shooting. Hawkins is inarguably the best movement shooter in the class and the fit alongside the Pelicans current crop of players is evident.
The rest of the night would play out uneventfully. The Pelicans made a few mild inquiries to break into the second round, I am told, with notable pursuit for South Carolina prospect GG Jackson. However, the severe deficit of second round picks made the venture futile. The Pelicans watched as division rival Memphis would scoop up Jackson and turned their attention to UDFA - where it appears they are signing Landers Nolley II.
Jordan Hawkins - The Pitch
There is a lot to like about Jordan Hawkins. As stated above, it is no question that Hawkins is the best movement shooter in the class. The degree of difficulty on the attempts combined with the volume of threes attempted make Hawkins a tantalizing fit with Zion Williamson and the rest of the Pelicans roster.
Hawkins was one for four players in the country who attempted at least 280 threes and made 38% of them. Hawkins routinely sprinted off screens at a dizzying pace only to launch lightning quick threes over helpless defenders. The motion was constant and speaks to the ridiculous shape he is in to accomplish it. The Pelicans have not had a player with this skillset outside of CJ McCollum - and McCollum has mostly not been used in this fashion thus far.
It doesn’t take a genius to see the appeal of inverted pick and rolls featuring Zion Williamson as the ball handler. This configuration was extremely successful with a half retired JJ Redick - one can only imagine what a younger and more athletic Hawkins will be able to conjure up. For reference, Hawkins shot a blistering 49.4% on catch and shoot looks.
Everything about Hawkins screams efficiency. There is no wasted movement in the form, footwork, or the set up. There is a level of craft and deception he possesses that is present only among the highest echelon of shooters. Beyond the Zion fit, it is easy to envision Hawkins being used on the weakside to create space in conjunction with one of the Pelicans non-shooters. The gravity will pay dividends as defenses are forced to step out. If Hawkins ends up developing any level of on-ball equity and the ability to pull up off the dribble consistently over defenders, the Pelicans will have a true weapon on their hands.
Finally, Hawkins competes on the defensive end. Slight of frame, Hawkins will not be able to physically overpower any players. Yet there is an attention to detail and consistent effort that he plays with. Hawkins isn’t your typical shooting specialist - he may yet have a future as either a point of attack defender or lock and trail. His supreme conditioning will be a major asset on this end, and so far Willie Green and his staff have proven they can elevate just about any player to becoming good rotationally.
Jordan Hawkins - The Concerns
My concerns with the Hawkins selection have nothing to do with the scout. The scout is obvious. The concerns rest squarely with the philosophy employed with regards to team building. By selecting the older, “more ready”, fit based player, the Pelicans are signaling belief in their core - a belief that was quite literally tested to the brink this past week. While there is nothing wrong with a little stress testing, I think the draft decision has the potential to be flawed for a few reasons.
Firstly, I do not believe in the concept of drafting for best fit. I have done extensive research on this topic and the main reasons to not draft for fit are the following:
NBA rosters turnover ~70% of their players every three years on average. The Pelicans came dangerously close to separating their star duo, and there is no reason to believe that this partnership will last long. Additionally, the new CBA should see an increase in attrition rate as teams will be seeking to avoid overly expensive rosters.
The average first round draft pick does not outproduce an average veteran minimum contract in the first four years. By this time, the roster will look significantly different - which defeats the purpose of drafting for fit.
Almost 70% of players selected in the first round will not be on the teams that drafted them by the conclusion of their rookie contract. The retention rate drops significantly for selections outside of the top 10.
There’s already a number of external factors working against the success of any draft pick, and drafting for fit specifically narrows the window for success in my opinion. Beyond this, how valuable is this specific fit?
I did a search for NBA players using the following conditions that Hawkins met this past year at UConn:
6’5’’ or shorter
Greater than .600 3pt attempt rate
Less than 10% assist rate
The results are sorted by BPM and they are not pretty. Here are the top 25:
While there are a few players on this list that have had mildly productive seasons and gone on to secure eight figure deals, the majority of the players found here are specialist journey men who have not moved the needle towards winning. More importantly - the majority of these players were acquired by their teams in these seasons for a cost significantly cheaper than a lottery pick. (Small aside here, as a fan of Isaiah Joe, the cheapness with which he was acquired pains me.)
There are a few notable names that didn’t fall in the top 25 of the search that I think could be pathways for Hawkins to see relatively good top end success. These names include JJ Redick, Tim Hardaway Jr., and Eric Gordon. Unfortunately all of these players saw their peak success away from the franchises that drafted them.
Concluding Thoughts
I will be rooting for Hawkins to succeed as a Pelican. Ideally, Zion’s generational paint touch ability lends itself to Hawkins translating early and providing the Pelicans with necessary spacing.
Philosophically I disagree with the thought process. The Pelicans in the David Griffin era have routinely attempted to split development and winning, and have come up short. The desire for stability in terms of competitiveness has bled dry what was a massive reservoir of assets. The Pelicans stagnation during the draft was caused largely by their own mistakes of years past and the need to correct them. The Devonte’ Graham trade cost them a first round pick and four second round picks outright, and we cannot fully grasp the opportunity cost. Could the Pelicans have executed on their desire to trade up or down if they had the necessary sweeteners? Pelicans officials certainly think the lack of second rounders made it difficult to trade into the back half of the draft.
Ultimately, the Pelicans have not been able to string together a series of moves that positions them favorably with respect to a long term vision. Many of their transactions appear to be addressing the needs of the immediate season while undoing the mistakes of the past. It is difficult to believe that a team so incredibly flush with assets has driven the team to a situation where they are neither salary flexible or asset flexible. The future first round picks they hold aren’t easy to toss into trades because of their unpredictable nature and relative value around the league. Meanwhile, the roster simply does not have the salary pieces to make major moves with the threat of the tax looming. It’s like playing Tetris and all you have are clunky zig-zag pieces that are difficult to maneuver.
Frankly I do not know if it is the vision of the front office causing the issues or the implicit desires of ownership in a small market. The playoff mandate was not exactly a secret during the Tom Benson and Dell Demps era. While David Griffin and his team have been afforded greater latitude than Demps’ team was given, I remain unconvinced that ownership desires have not played a role in the overall approach in team building. The tax looms ever present and the fear of it has led the Pelicans to routinely make cost cutting moves. Now in fairness, the Pelicans have not exactly put themselves in a position that merits paying the tax, and the Benson ownership group certainly has not spared expenses in the hiring and firing of coaches.
Nevertheless, it is possible I am overthinking the whole situation. The Pelicans at the end of the day have two all-star level players, a cadre of young players who move the needle towards winning, and more picks than their own. When looking at the team with respect to a long term vision - how can one ignore Trey Murphy, Herb Jones, Dyson Daniels and now Jordan Hawkins brought in to compliment the star duo? Despite everything, they still have pathways to whichever team building construction they desire. Perhaps it is only a matter of time before they decide the time is right to act in franchise changing direction.
I’m curious what players we could have drafted at 14 that wouldn’t be “fit” picks. Shooting isn’t a fit it’s a skill. The only draft guide I saw that had Hawkins outside the top 20 was The Ringer, so we probably didn’t reach for him. There was that analytics chart (forgot the name) that didn’t like him also. But, the vast majority of grades and post draft podcasts I’ve played liked him a lot. I don’t understand the philosophy critique. We drafted a raw non-shooting player last year. A shooter before that and an SEC DPOY as well. It’s a diverse group. The notion of this being a “safe” picks just seems lazy to me. I think people say safe when they wish they could criticize it more because they want to be critical but don’t really have reasons to be.
Totally agree. Hawkins is not who I would have chosen, but the fit on paper is fine. The problem is that it's the sort of pick a top tier, proven contender makes - the Nuggets made a similar style of pick selection this year, taking guys who are low-upside but who fit small gaps that make sense on their roster. The problem is that we're not the Nuggets. Griff played this draft as though we were in cruise control, ignoring the fact that the road we're cruising may well be a dead end.
Brilliant write up, looking forward to hearing your thoughts on how we might handle the rest of the summer, especially seeing some of your thoughts on twitter re the C position.